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Threat Intelligence

Text-to-Malware: How Cybercriminals Weaponize Fake AI-Themed Websites

Registration Date

creativepro[.]ai

2024-07-10

boostcreatives[.]ai

2024-07-12

creativepro-ai[.]com

2024-08-02

boostcreatives-ai[.]com

2024-08-04

creativespro-ai[.]com

2024-08-07

klingxai[.]com

2024-09-19

lumaai-labs[.]com

2024-09-29

klings-ai[.]com

2024-10-17

luma-dream[.]com

2024-10-26

quirkquestai[.]com

2024-11-02

lumaai-dream[.]com

2024-11-06

lumaai-lab[.]com

2024-11-08

lumaaidream[.]com

2024-11-09

lumaailabs[.]com

2024-11-10

luma-dreamai[.]com

2024-11-12

ai-kling[.]com

2024-11-22

dreamai-luma[.]com

2024-12-13

aikling[.]ai

2025-01-04

aisoraplus[.]com

2025-01-07

lumalabsai[.]in

2025-01-16

canvadream-lab[.]com

2025-01-20

canvadreamlab[.]com

2025-01-25

adobe-express[.]com

2025-02-08

canva-dreamlab[.]com

2025-02-12

canvadreamlab[.]ai

2025-02-14

canvaproai[.]com

2025-02-17

capcutproai[.]com

2025-02-22

luma-aidream[.]com

2025-02-27

luma-dreammachine[.]com

2025-03-07












YARA Rules


rule G_Dropper_COILHATCH_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" strings: $i1 = "zlib.decompress" ascii wide $i2 = "rc4" ascii wide $i3 = "aes_decrypt" ascii wide $i4 = "xor" ascii wide $i5 = "rsa_decrypt" ascii wide $r1 = "private_key" ascii wide $r2 = "runner" ascii wide $r3 = "marshal" ascii wide $r4 = "marshal.loads" ascii wide $r5 = "b85decode" ascii wide $r6 = "exceute_func" ascii wide $r7 = "hybrid_decrypt" ascii wide condition: (4 of ($i*)) and all of ($r*) }

rule G_Dropper_STARKVEIL_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" strings: $p00_0 = { 56 57 53 48 83 EC ?? 48 8D AA [4] 48 8B 7D  ?? 48 8B 4F ?? FF 15 [4] 48 89 F9 } $p00_1 = { 0F 0B 66 0F 1F 84 00 [4] 48 89 54 24 ?? 55 41  56 56 57 53 48 83 EC } condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550  and (($p00_0 in (48000 .. 59000) and $p00_1 in (100000 .. 120000))) }

import "dotnet" rule G_Downloader_GRIMPULL_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" strings: $str1 = "SbieDll.dll" ascii wide $str2 = "cuckoomon.dll" ascii wide $str3 = "vmGuestLib.dll" ascii wide $str4 = "select * from Win32_BIOS" ascii wide $str5 = "VMware|VIRTUAL|A M I|Xen" ascii wide $str6 = "Microsoft|VMWare|Virtual" ascii wide $str7 = "win32_process.handle='{0}'" ascii wide $str8 = "stealer" ascii wide $code = { 11 20 11 0F 11 20 11 0F 91 11 1A 11 0F 91 61 D2 9C } condition: dotnet.is_dotnet and all of them }

rule G_Backdoor_FROSTRIFT_1 { meta: author = "Mandiant" strings: $guid = "$23e83ead-ecb2-418f-9450-813fb7da66b8" $r1 = "IdentifiableDecryptor.DecryptorStack" $r2 = "$ProtoBuf.Explorers.ExplorerDecryptor" $s1 = "\\User Data\\" wide $s2 = "SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct" wide $s3 = "Telegram.exe" wide $s4 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_PnPEntity WHERE (PNPClass =  'Image' OR PNPClass = 'Camera')" wide $s5 = "Litecoin-Qt" wide $s6 = "Bitcoin-Qt" wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and (all of ($s*) or $guid or all of ($r*)) }

YARA-L Rules


Mandiant has made the relevant rules available in the Google SecOps Mandiant Intel Emerging Threats curated detections rule set. The activity discussed in the blog post is detected under the rule names:

  • Suspicious Binary File Execution - MP4 Masquerade

  • Suspicious Binary File Execution - Double Extension and Braille Pattern Blank Masquerade

  • Python Script Deobfuscation - Base85 ZLib Marshal

  • Suspicious Staging Directory WinSystem

  • DLL Search Order Hijacking AVCodec61

  • DLL Search Order Hijacking HEIF

  • DLL Search Order Hijacking Libde265



Published: 2025-05-27T05:00:00











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